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THE LENDING-LIMIT COMBINATION RULES: 
REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT AT THE 
OCC 
DOUGLAS C. DREIER† 
An agency cannot merely flit serendipitously from case to case, 
like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the rules as it goes 
along. 
– Judge Bruce M. Selya1 
ABSTRACT 
  The regulation-by-enforcement critique has made an impact at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and scholars are beginning to 
turn this critique against other agencies. Using this critique, this Note 
demonstrates that the federal combination rules for the lending-limit 
law should be rewritten. Under the lending-limit law, national 
banking associations may lend only a certain percentage of their 
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus to any one borrower. 
Although the combination rules include several per se rules pursuant 
to which loans made to two borrowers will be aggregated, they also 
grant the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) the power 
to determine ad hoc whether to aggregate two loans. This power to 
determine on an ad hoc and even on a post hoc basis whether a 
violation of the law has occurred is an affront to the rule of law and is 
unfair to the industry. The combination rules should be amended to 
remove the OCC’s power to make ad hoc determinations. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, scholars,2 the media,3 and 
legislators turned their focus to banking regulators and how they 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Douglas C. Dreier. 
 † Duke University, J.D. and M.A. expected 2013; Cornell University, B.A. 2010. I am 
grateful to Martin Werner for introducing me to this topic, to Deborah DeMott and Lawrence 
Baxter for their feedback on earlier drafts of this Note, and to the Duke Law Journal editorial 
staff. 
 1. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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regulate the banking industry.4 As Comptroller of the Currency 
Thomas Curry has explained, the “mission of ensuring the safety and 
soundness of America’s national banks and federal savings 
associations has never been more important or more challenging.”5 
This Note focuses on one of the ways in which the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ensures the safety and soundness 
of financial institutions—namely, by preventing financial institutions 
from lending too much money to any one borrower.6 Because loans 
made to two technically distinct borrowers may carry the same risk as 
loans made to one borrower, the OCC has established combination 
rules to define when two borrowers should be treated as one.7 As 
explained in Part II, these combination rules do not inform banks 
whether a given loan would exceed a bank’s capital requirements 
because the OCC may aggregate loans to two borrowers whenever 
“the facts and circumstances” warrant such action.8 
Political theory has long held the rule of law in high esteem. 
Aristotle wrote that “the law must govern, and not individuals,”9 and 
that “the rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual.”10 
When a rulemaker has the power to determine whether past conduct 
violated some heretofore unstated law, the rule of law is rendered 
 
 2. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical 
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 706 (2012) (discussing “the appropriate balance between capital 
regulation by rule and capital regulation by enforcement”). 
 3. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Dodd-Frank Backers Clash with Regulator, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2011, at B1. 
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Jack Reed, Reed Urges a “Fundamental 
Rethink” of Leadership at the OCC (June 22, 2011), available at http://reed.senate.gov/
press/release/reed-urges-a-fundamental-rethink-of-leadership-at-the-occ (expressing “extreme[] 
concern[] about the lack of prudent leadership at the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency”). 
 5. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas J. Curry Takes 
Office as the 30th Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.occ.gov/
 news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-58.html. 
 6. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2013) (establishing 
that one of the purposes of regulations issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 84 is to “protect the safety 
and soundness of national banks and savings associations by preventing excessive loans to one 
person”). 
 7. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5. 
 8. See infra Part II.  
 9. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 160 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press ed. 
1908) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 10. Id. bk. III, at 139. 
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obsolete.11 An industry should be able to know what the law is by 
examining the applicable laws and regulations. When the law is 
unclear, it is unfair for an agency to hold people accountable for 
violating that law. 
This idea is at the heart of the regulation-by-enforcement 
critique. Regulation by enforcement occurs when an agency creates a 
piecemeal rule via enforcement actions or interpretive letters, 
bypassing the normal rulemaking process.12 The regulation-by-
enforcement critique has historically been applied to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), but in recent years scholars have 
extended this critique to other agencies.13 This Note further extends 
the regulation-by-enforcement critique to the OCC, an agency 
historically less visible than the SEC,14 but no less important. Part I of 
this Note describes the regulation-by-enforcement critique. Part II 
explains the lending-limit law and the combination rules. Part III 
explains why the OCC should not rely on regulation by enforcement 
in the context of the combination rules. 
The combination rules provide one particularly egregious 
example of regulation by enforcement in the field of banking 
regulation. With the combination rules, the OCC has established 
multiple per se tests according to which the OCC will aggregate loans 
made to two related borrowers, but the OCC has also granted itself 
the discretion to determine whether to aggregate loans. This grant of 
discretion undermines the purpose of having per se rules at all: there 
is little point to having the per se rules if the OCC can aggregate loans 
whenever it deems fit. A grant of this much discretion undermines 
 
 11. See Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in 
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 123 (Robert P. George ed., 1994) 
(defining the rule of law as “treating people with formal fairness, that is, in a rational and 
predictable way, setting public standards for citizens’ conduct and officials’ responses thereto, 
standards by which one can judge one’s compliance or non-compliance, rather than leaving 
everything to discretionary and potentially arbitrary decision”). 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. Compare Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A 
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155 (1990) (“Unlike many of its sister 
agencies, the SEC consistently has maintained a vigorous, highly-visible, and largely successful 
enforcement profile.”), with COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 66 (2006), available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“By contrast [to the 
SEC], bank regulators, concentrating on the ‘safety and soundness’ of the financial system, take 
a prudential approach to supervision and generally do not broadly publicize their enforcement 
actions.”).  
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rule-of-law values. The OCC should amend its combination rules so 
that the law is apparent from the text of the rules. 
I.  THE REGULATION-BY-ENFORCEMENT CRITIQUE 
In creating law, agencies have three main options available to 
them: formal rulemaking, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and 
regulation by enforcement. Formal rulemaking is used, for instance, 
in some food-additive and ratemaking proceedings.15 It is, however, a 
“seldom used” option16 because it is triggered only when a statute 
other than the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)17 requires a rule 
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.18 In 
contrast, notice-and-comment rulemaking occurs when an agency 
makes a rule pursuant to the APA.19 The APA requires that agencies 
(1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) provide an 
opportunity for public participation in the rulemaking by the 
submission of written comments, and (3) publish a final rule and an 
accompanying statement of basis and purpose not less than thirty 
days before the rule’s effective date.20 Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is the most common way that agencies establish rules.21 
Agencies sometimes bypass formal rulemaking and notice-and-
comment rulemaking, opting instead for regulation by enforcement 
and for making policy through enforcement actions and interpretive 
letters.22 Regulation by enforcement occurs not when an agency issues 
 
 15. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 5 (5th ed. 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 18. LUBBERS, supra note 15, at 5. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). The APA imposes three general requirements on the 
administrative process: 
First, it requires that various governmental actions be publicized, or made available to 
public scrutiny. . . . Second, the APA imposes various procedural requirements on 
rulemaking and adjudication. . . . Third, the APA grants aggrieved parties the 
opportunity to challenge agency action in court on the grounds that it violates the 
Constitution or federal statutory law, including . . . the procedural requirements of 
the APA. 
Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Process Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 95, 100–01 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
 21. LUBBERS, supra note 15, at 5. 
 22. James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 
635–36 (2007). Interpretive letters are letters in which an agency responds to a request for 
guidance on the applicability of a particular regulation. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on 
Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed 
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an interpretive letter to clarify a vague rule, but rather when the 
agency uses interpretive letters to create a rule that does not 
otherwise exist.23 It is this use of interpretive letters which offends the 
Aristotelian ideal of the rule of law. 
A. Defining Regulation by Enforcement 
Since at least 1982, the SEC has received criticism for bypassing 
the rulemaking process and instead making policy through 
enforcement actions and no-action letters24—in other words, for 
regulation by enforcement.25 Professor Roberta Karmel first 
articulated the regulation-by-enforcement-critique in her influential 
book, Regulation by Prosecution.26 
Professor Karmel, a former commissioner of the SEC, wrote 
Regulation by Prosecution as “an act of self-justification, an effort to 
explain why and how the relationship between government and 
business—and more specifically, federal securities regulation—must 
be changed.”27 Professor Karmel was “disturbed by the spectacle of a 
government prosecutor failing to justify its policies and programs 
under its enabling legislation.”28 She argued that the SEC had been 
unnecessarily antagonistic toward business, pursuing certain cases 
without adequate authority.29 Using examples such as SEC 
enforcement actions against companies for paying bribes abroad, she 
shows how the SEC has failed to lay out its rules so that those it has 
taken enforcement actions against could know what those rules 
were.30 
 
Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 937 (1998). For a discussion on the often blurred 
distinction between interpretive letters and no-action letters, see id. at 937–38. 
 23. See Park, supra note 22, at 637 (“The ‘Regulation by Enforcement’ critique reflects a 
general sense that norms are best initiated by rulemaking whereas enforcement actions should 
merely enact previously defined rules.”). 
 24. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 95 (1982) (“The evils of combining 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions have been exacerbated by the [SEC’s] predilection for 
formulating regulatory policy through the prosecution of enforcement cases.”). 
 25. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 26. KARMEL, supra note 24. 
 27. Id. at 15. 
 28. Id. at 151. 
 29. Id. at 151–55. For a brief summary of Professor Karmel’s work, see Park, supra note 22, 
at 635. 
 30. See KARMEL, supra note 24, at 155. 
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Professor Karmel’s regulation-by-enforcement critique begins 
with a simple assertion: “Lack of corporate accountability may be 
troubling, but lack of accountability on the part of government is far 
more dangerous.”31 But the SEC, instead of taking formal action to 
create rules, has at times chosen to rely on case-by-case enforcement 
actions to develop policy.32 For instance, in the 1970s the SEC sought 
to encourage publicly held corporations to use independent auditors.33 
The SEC requested the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) to take the position that independent auditors 
needed to deal with a publicly held corporation through an audit 
committee of independent directors, rather than through the 
corporation’s full board of directors.34 When the AICPA refused to 
do so, the SEC then brought enforcement actions against 
corporations that had failed to implement such a policy, without first 
proposing such a rule and without a congressional mandate.35 To 
Professor Karmel, the SEC’s regulation by enforcement did not 
square with the American value of governmental transparency. The 
rule of law requires government agencies not to operate on a case-by-
case basis. 
Scholars have continued to level the regulation-by-enforcement 
critique at the SEC.36 Historically, however, scholars have not 
extended this critique to other agencies, perhaps because most 
agencies have not maintained an enforcement profile as “vigorous, 
highly-visible, and . . . successful” as has the SEC.37 But the SEC is not 
unique. Like the SEC, the OCC and other banking regulators rely 
“on a mix of regulation by rule and regulation by enforcement.”38 The 
former Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, showed his 
willingness to rely on regulation by enforcement, arguing that “it is 
imperative that regulatory capital requirements be able to adapt 
quickly to innovation and to changes in accounting standards and 
 
 31. Id. at 151. 
 32. Id. at 153. 
 33. Id. at 152–53. 
 34. Id. at 153. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally, e.g., Nagy, supra note 22; Park, supra note 22; Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 
14. 
 37. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 155. 
 38. Hill, supra note 2, at 707. 
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other regulations.”39 The alternative, Secretary Geithner argued, 
would “produce an ossified safety and soundness framework that is 
unable to evolve to keep pace with change and to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage.”40 
Two examples in which banking regulators rely on regulation by 
enforcement are capital requirements and the lending-limit 
combination rules. Professor Julie Andersen Hill has provided a 
thorough discussion of the former,41 and this Note discusses the latter. 
As Professor Hill explains, bank regulators have created ad hoc 
capital requirements for the banks, and these requirements have not 
been consistent from bank to bank or from regulator to regulator.42 
Capital is the difference between a bank’s assets and its deposits and 
other liabilities.43 A bank’s capital divided by its total assets must 
generally equal at least 4 percent.44 But the regulations governing 
bank capital requirements provide significant discretion for regulators 
to set capital requirements for each bank.45 For instance, the OCC’s 
regulations provide that the factors to be considered in determining 
capital requirements “vary in each case”46 and that the OCC may 
consider the “overall condition, management strength, and future 
prospects of the bank” in making that determination.47 The OCC has 
used this discretion to require banks to hold much more capital than 
what the 4 percent threshold would seem to require.48 By relying on 
their discretionary power, bank regulators have foregone rulemaking, 
which would have been “less costly, more transparent, and more 
likely to consider macroeconomic concerns,” in their quest for greater 
discretion.49 It may well be that bank regulators should require banks 
 
 39. Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to Keith Ellison, U.S. 
Representative (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://ellison.house.gov/images/stories/Documents
/2010/01-11-10_Treasury_Letter.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Hill, supra note 2. 
 42. Id. at 648. 
 43. DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42744, U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE BASEL CAPITAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 2 (2012). 
 44. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE 
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 256 (4th ed. 2009). 
 45. Hill, supra note 2, at 656. 
 46. 12 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2013). 
 47. Id. § 3.11(c). 
 48. See Hill, supra note 2, at 648 (“Through discretionary capital increases implemented on 
a bank-by-bank basis, bank regulators are creating ad hoc capital requirements that are, in some 
cases, much higher than capital requirements published in regulations.”). 
 49. Id. at 708. 
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to hold more capital as a policy matter because banks that hold more 
capital are better able to withstand bank runs,50 but according to 
Professor Hill, the regulators should do so openly and by means of a 
clear rule.51 
Like its rules for capital requirements, the OCC’s combination 
rules for the lending-limit law grant the OCC near limitless discretion 
to determine when the loans made to two borrowers should be 
aggregated and treated as if they were made to a single borrower.52 
Because the combination rules obscure when two borrowers qualify 
as a single borrower, these rules obscure when a financial institution 
violates Congress’s lending-limit law. A fuller discussion of these 
rules appears in Part II. 
B. Why Regulation by Enforcement is Objectionable 
The critics of regulation by enforcement argue that it sidesteps 
the rulemaking process, fails to take advantage of the expert input 
that comes from the rulemaking process, and unfairly surprises 
industry by failing to provide guidance regarding what is illegal.53 The 
SEC has acknowledged that it “ha[s] been criticized for attempting to 
‘make new law’ in an uncertain area by means of enforcement 
action.”54 At times, the SEC has accepted the validity of this critique 
and has opted instead to make policy through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.55 Yet regulation by enforcement is sometimes the only 
 
 50. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013) (arguing that banks 
should raise more capital and carry less debt). But see GETTER, supra note 43, at 7 (raising the 
possibility that “[i]nvestors could possibly interpret a bank’s decision to raise capital as a sign 
that its default or funding risks may be increasing,” which could lead investors to sell their stock 
and ironically increase the risk of bank failure). For a review of ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra, see 
John H. Cochrane, Running on Empty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2013, at C5. 
 51. Hill, supra note 2, at 706 (arguing that clear rulemaking “should be the preferred 
method of setting capital requirements”). 
 52. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4) (stating that a common enterprise will be deemed to exist 
“[w]hen the [OCC] determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of 
particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”). 
 53. Park, supra note 22, at 632. 
 54. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange 
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 
51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249 (2012)). 
 55. Id. 
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option available to the SEC, in which case this method may be 
appropriate as a “last resort.”56 
By allowing an agency greater discretion, regulation by 
enforcement may have certain advantages for the agency,57 but it adds 
ambiguity to the law.58 All too often, as Professor Karmel and other 
scholars have explained,59 the result of regulation by enforcement is 
nothing but “confusion and distrust.”60 When rules are deficient, 
agencies should change them and release new rules. They should not 
short-circuit the rulemaking process by relying on enforcement 
actions or interpretive letters.61 Regulation by enforcement is unfairly 
surprising to industry.62 It may cause significant economic disruption.63 
And it sidesteps the administrative scheme and the benefits it 
provides of expert input and deliberation.64 Although some degree of 
uncertainty in the law is always to be expected,65 regulation by 
enforcement takes this uncertainty to an extreme. As Professor 
 
 56. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 167; see also id. (“In a proper context, an 
administrative agency should define normative standards first, offer interpretive guidance 
second (to the extent feasible), and compel obedience to those standards as a last resort, when it 
is clear that those standards have been well publicized and comprehended, but disregarded.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 2, at 694 (“The traditional justification for allowing regulators 
discretion to adjust individual bank capital requirements is that mechanically determined 
numerical capital requirements are insufficient to safeguard deposits in a dynamic and complex 
banking industry.”). 
 58. Id. at 700. 
 59. See, e.g., KARMEL, supra note 24, at 95 (“[The SEC enforcement] program can be 
attacked as creating uncertainty, leading to an unwarranted accretion of the SEC’s jurisdiction, 
and discriminating unfairly against prosecutorial targets with interesting or novel violations.”); 
James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition To Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 115, 152 (2012) (“[Critics] argued that principle-enforcement did not give the industry 
enough notice as to what conduct was prohibited.”); Park, supra note 22, at 635–37 
(“‘Regulation by Enforcement’ raises concerns in that ‘notions of due process require ample, 
advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be prohibited, before any person 
may be civilly or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those standards.’” (quoting Pitt & 
Shapiro, supra note 14, at 167)). 
 60. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 14, at 66 (“When new standards 
are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later codified as explicit rules, 
confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”). 
 61. Id. at 67. 
 62. Park, supra note 22, at 632. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the use of 
words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”). 
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Karmel explains, it “transform[s]” an agency’s enforcement program 
“into a policy-making and, therefore, highly political tool.”66 
By arguing that the regulation-by-enforcement critique applies to 
banking regulators just as it applies to the SEC, this Note does not 
deny that banks are, in certain aspects, fundamentally different from 
other companies. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]anking is 
one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public 
callings.”67 At least since the introduction of deposit insurance by the 
Banking Act of 1933,68 banking regulators have had a vital role to play 
in protecting the safety and soundness of banks.69 This special status 
means that banks should indeed be subject to heavy regulation.70 But 
heavy regulation can still come in the form of clear rules;71 it need not 
come in the form of unfettered discretion. 
 
 66. KARMEL, supra note 24, at 336. 
 67. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); see also Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial 
Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the Federal Banking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM 
L. REV. S193, S195–96 (1991) (describing the long history and relationship between banks and 
regulators). 
 68. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a history of deposit insurance in America, see generally FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf. 
 69. See Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness 
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 210, 
211 (1993) (“From the very inception of the federal insurance system in 1933, safety and 
soundness has been a principal concern driving a ‘cradle to grave’ regime of tight regulation; it is 
a corollary of the federal insurance safety net upon which rests the constitutional and prudential 
justification for federal regulation of even state chartered depository institutions (whenever 
those institutions elect to become federally insured).” (citations omitted) (quoting People v. 
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951))). 
 70. See Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for 
Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2–3 (2006) (arguing that regulation of banks is necessary 
“in heavy doses” because of banks’ special characteristics). For a critique of Professor Macey’s 
article, see Peter J. Wallison, Banking Regulation’s Illusive Quest, 30 REGULATION, Spring 2007, 
at 18. 
 71. Granted, heavy rule-based regulation will result in regulations that span page after 
page. A proposed version of the Volcker Rule, for instance, covers 127 pages of the Federal 
Register. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,846–68,972 
(Nov. 7, 2011). The proposed Volcker Rule has continued to expand and, considering how many 
exceptions it now contains, might not be the best example of heavy bank regulation. See Jesse 
Eisinger, The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb. 22, 
2012, 12:04 PM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/the-volcker-rule-made-bloated-and-
weak (observing that the proposed Volcker Rule has become “a 530-page monstrosity of 
hopeless complexity and vagueness”). 
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Many scholars have enumerated regulation by enforcement’s 
faults. This Note focuses on five specific criticisms of regulation by 
enforcement levied by Professor Donna Nagy.72 First, regulation by 
enforcement “produces a dearth of authoritative pronouncements on 
which the public and, by extension, courts, can rely for guidance.”73 
After receiving an interpretive letter from the OCC, for instance, a 
bank may know how the OCC will act toward it, but other banks do 
not know how the OCC would act if presented with a slightly 
different fact pattern. 
Second, regulation by enforcement is “an inefficient method of 
law making”74 that is “time-consuming and cumbersome.”75 For 
instance, when capital requirements are established through 
regulation by enforcement, as opposed to by clear statute or 
regulation, banks cannot assess ex ante the amount of capital 
necessary to satisfy their controlling statute or regulation.76 When 
regulators set capital requirements through formal or informal 
capital-enforcement actions, banks have a difficult time assessing the 
amount of capital that their regulators might require. As Professor 
Hill has explained, “[t]his can be costly not only for a bank receiving 
an enforcement action, but also for the economy as a whole.”77 
Third, regulation by enforcement “increases the likelihood of 
agency capture and special-interest decisionmaking,” given that an 
interpretive letter is the result of a discussion between the regulator 
and the individual regulated entity requesting the letter.78 The APA 
states that an agency cannot adopt a rule until all regulated entities 
and other interested parties have received notice and have had an 
opportunity to comment.79 This broad participative process helps to 
prevent the agency from overlooking any considerations that ought to 
influence its opinion.80 The participative process leads to better rules 
because it allows agencies to learn more about the subject of 
regulation and because it helps offset any biases that may arise during 
 
 72. Nagy, supra note 22, at 957–61. 
 73. Id. at 957. 
 74. Id. at 958. 
 75. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 19 (3d 
ed. 1995). 
 76. Hill, supra note 2, at 700. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Nagy, supra note 22, at 959 (footnote omitted). 
 79. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
 80. Park, supra note 22, at 665–66. 
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the one-on-one discussion that occurs while preparing an interpretive 
letter.81 Even though the participative process is not altogether 
immune from these biases,82 it may weaken them.83 
Fourth, the piecemeal nature of interpretive letters “may lead to 
regulatory interpretations that are inconsistent with each other or 
with the broader statutory framework.”84 Courts have taken notice of 
how inconsistent agency letters can be.85 Historically, inconsistencies 
have riddled agency letters,86 and the problem of inconsistency 
persists.87 The OCC is not immune to this problem, and it has faced 
criticism for perceived inconsistencies between some of its 
interpretive letters in the past.88 
Lastly, an agency’s reliance on interpretive letters “contravenes 
the spirit, and arguably the letter, of the APA’s notice and comment 
provisions.”89 Although the APA exempts “interpretive rules and 
statements of policy” from the notice-and-comment requirement,90 an 
agency should not misuse this exemption “to accomplish indirectly 
 
 81. Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy 
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 574 (1977).  
 82. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making 
of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1925431 (“[T]he powerful interest groups 
most affected by Dodd-Frank did not waste the opportunities provided by the Volcker Rule’s 
gaps and ambiguities. Instead, as evidenced by both public comment letters and meeting logs, 
they actively lobbied agencies to adopt favorable definitions, interpretations, and 
exemptions . . . .”). 
 83. See Nagy, supra note 22, at 959 (contrasting the public comment process with 
“policymaking through the no-action letter process,” which “substantially increases the 
likelihood of agency capture”). 
 84. Id. at 960. 
 85. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123 
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he group within the SEC that handles investor disclosure matters and issues 
no-action letters[] continued to apply this interpretation consistently for fifteen years until 1990, 
when it began applying a different interpretation, although at first in an ad hoc and inconsistent 
manner.” (footnote omitted)). 
 86. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing 
Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303 (1973) (discussing how SEC no-
action letters have caused inconsistencies in a number of fields). 
 87. See Kab Lae Kim, A Study on Rule 145 of the Securities Act of 1933: How To Provide 
Clarity and Predictability in Rule 145 Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 131, 169 (2007) (deriding 
the “excessive and inconsistent ‘no-action letters’” issued by the SEC on Rule 145, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006)). 
 88. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., OCC Interpretive Letter, 1988 OCC Ltr. 
LEXIS 266, at *48–50 (Aug. 8, 1988) (defending against the criticism that its “[d]ecision is 
inconsistent with previous OCC statements”); see also infra text accompanying note 104. 
 89. Nagy, supra note 22, at 960. 
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006). 
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what the APA forbids it to accomplish directly” by “announc[ing] in 
no-action letters what are, in effect, new regulatory requirements or 
obligations without providing prior notice or the opportunity for 
public comments.”91  
Because of the harm caused by regulation by enforcement, an 
agency should rely on regulation by enforcement only “as a last 
resort.”92 Unfortunately, as is explained in Part II, the OCC has not 
evidenced this restraint in crafting its combination rules. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMBINATION RULES 
The OCC is a bureau located within the Department of the 
Treasury.93 It is one of three—formerly four94—agencies in charge of 
regulating the financial industry.95 Its purpose is to “assur[e] the safety 
and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations, fair 
access to financial services, and fair treatment of customers by, the 
institutions and other persons subject to its jurisdiction.”96 In addition 
to overall capital requirements,97 banks also have separate risk-
lowering lending limitations, which cap the amount of capital that a 
bank can lend to any single borrower.98 Since the enactment of the 
first federal lending-limit law during the Civil War,99 the law 
governing lending limits has undergone significant changes.100 As 
 
 91. Nagy, supra note 22, at 962 (criticizing SEC regulation by enforcement via no-action 
letters). 
 92. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 93. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 94. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) previously supervised federally insured savings 
banks and thrifts. Functions and Responsibilities of the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 12 C.F.R. § 500.1 (2009). The OTS’s role in the financial crisis led to it being 
labeled “the worst federal regulator on the block.” Mary Kane, Agency at Forefront of Mortgage 
Crisis Making a Comeback, WASH. INDEP. (Jan. 9, 2009), http://washingtonindependent.com/
24782/insurance-firms-aim-for-tarp-money-less-oversight (quoting Professor Patricia McCoy). 
In response, Congress eliminated the OTS.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 25–26 (2010). 
 95. Hill, supra note 2, at 650. 
 96. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a). 
 97. See supra Part I.A. 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 99. Currency Act, § 47, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 679 (1863) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 84); see also Donald E. Frechette, National Bank Lending Limits and the Attribution 
Rules of 12 U.S.C. § 84: Congress and the Comptroller Cover the Bases, 2 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 1, 
2–4 (1991) (describing the history of the federal lending-limit law). 
 100. Compare Currency Act § 47, 12 Stat at 679 (mandating that “the total liabilities of any 
person, or of any company or firm . . . shall at no time exceed one third . . . of the amount of the 
capital stock”), with 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (prohibiting loans to a single borrower from 
“exceed[ing] 15 per centum of the [bank’s] unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus”). 
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World War I drew to a close in 1918, Congress amended the federal 
lending-limit law by empowering the comptroller of the currency to 
develop rules regulating lending limits and to determine when loans 
made to two borrowers should be treated as if they were made to a 
single borrower.101 
Originally, the comptroller of the currency exercised this power 
by means of “general rules.”102 These general rules evolved and 
gained some degree of specificity via administrative practice and 
interpretive letters, but they evolved on a case-by-case basis, without 
the benefit of further written rules.103 The OCC eventually recognized 
that the combination rules were “inconsistently applied” and “overly 
complicated.”104 The 1982 passage of the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act105 finally propelled the OCC to delineate 
its combination rules more clearly. At the time, the OCC stated that it 
needed to provide clear combination rules and that the alternative—
the combination of loans on a post hoc basis—was “wholly 
undesirable.”106 The OCC noted two reasons why this alternative was 
so undesirable. First, “if combination of loans were to be done only 
on a post hoc basis, banks would have little, if any, certainty as to how 
to operate to avoid violations of Section 84 and the attendant 
possibility of directors’ liability.”107 Second, “[t]he [OCC], in turn, 
would find itself faced with an endless stream of requests for opinion 
letters from banks wishing to operate cautiously; examiners would be 
equally overburdened in their attempts to judge each set of 
circumstances on its facts.”108 Unfortunately, the OCC has stopped 
short in its commitment to clear rules. 
 
 101. Supplement to Second Liberty Bond Act, § 6, ch. 176, 40 Stat. 965, 967 (1918). 
 102. National Bank Lending Limits, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,862, 56,863 (Dec. 21, 1982) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
 103. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). An “interpretive letter” in the OCC context is the same as a 
“no-action letter” in the SEC context. See Joshua E. Broaded, A Survey of Regulations 
Applicable to Investment Advisers, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 27, 31 (2009) (“These public letters, which 
are often called ‘no-action letters’ or ‘interpretive letters,’ can then be considered by 
other[s] . . . grappling with similar questions.”). 
 104. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846. 
 105. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat 
1469, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 106. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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A. The Current Law 
Section 84 of Title 12 of the United States Code sets the federal 
lending limit for national banks. A national bank is a bank chartered 
under federal, not state, law.109 A national bank may not loan more 
than 15 percent of its unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus to 
any one borrower, if not fully secured by collateral with a market 
value at least equal to the amount of the loan.110 A national bank may, 
however, issue an additional fully secured loan to a maxed-out 
borrower if the loan does not exceed 10 percent of the bank’s 
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.111 The law also authorizes 
the OCC to adopt rules governing “when a loan putatively made to a 
person shall for purposes of this section be attributed to another 
person.”112 
Section 32.5 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
adopted pursuant to Section 84, prescribes that two borrowers will be 
combined and deemed to be one borrower “[w]hen proceeds of a 
loan . . . are to be used for the direct benefit of the other 
person . . . or . . . [w]hen a common enterprise is deemed to exist 
between the persons.”113 It also contains specialized rules for the 
aggregation of loans (1) to a “corporate group”;114 (2) to foreign 
governments, their agencies, and their instrumentalities;115 and (3) to 
partnerships, joint ventures, and associations.116 
 
 109. Eliot C. Schaefer, Comment, The Credit Card Act of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National 
Usury Rate Would Provide Consumers with the Protection They Need, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 741, 
747 n.65 (2012). 
 110. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (2006). 
 111. Id. § 84(a)(2). 
 112. Id. § 84(d)(2). 
 113. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(a) (2013). 
 114. Id. § 32.5(d)(1).  A loan to a corporate group may not exceed 50 percent of a bank’s 
capital and surplus. Id. A “corporate group” is defined as “a person and all of its subsidiaries,” 
and a person’s “subsidiary” is defined as a corporation or a limited liability company for which 
the person “owns or beneficially owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of [its] voting 
securities or voting interests.” Id. 
 115. Id. § 32.5(f). Loans to foreign governments, their agencies, and their instrumentalities 
are aggregated with one another only if the loans fail to satisfy one of two tests:  either (1) “the 
borrower has resources or revenue of its own sufficient to service” the loan, or (2) the purpose 
of the loan “is consistent with the purposes of the borrower's general business.” Id. § 32.5(f)(1). 
 116. Id. § 32.5(e). A loan to a partnership, joint venture, or association is deemed to be a 
loan to each member of the partnership, joint venture, or association so long as the member is 
liable for the loan, but a loan to a member of a partnership, joint venture, or association is not 
attributed to the partnership, joint venture, or association unless the loan satisfies the direct-
benefit or common-enterprise test. Id. 
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Section 32.5 attempts to provide further guidance by defining 
what constitutes a “direct benefit” or a “common enterprise.”117 
Under the direct-benefit test, the proceeds of a loan will be attributed 
to another person “when the proceeds, or assets purchased with the 
proceeds, are transferred to another person, other than in a bona fide 
arm’s length transaction.”118 One example of the OCC’s reliance on 
the direct-benefit test arises from the OCC’s enforcement action 
against Texas National Bank.119 The bank issued loans to (1) a 
wealthy individual with an estimated net worth of several hundred 
million dollars, (2) his spouse, (3) twenty corporations owned by the 
family, and (4) their children.120 The family created the twenty 
corporations to hold shopping-center properties that the family 
already personally owned.121 The purported purpose of the loans to 
the corporations was to finance the borrowers’ “purchases” of the 
shopping-center properties.122 After the so-called purchases, proceeds 
of the loans were either paid in cash to the family or were “used to 
pay off any outstanding mortgages on the properties transferred.”123 
Subsequently, the children received a majority interest in each of the 
twenty corporations.124 Thus, “the entire matter was motivated by 
estate planning considerations.”125 Because the proceeds of the loans 
were used for “an intra-family restructuring of assets,” rather than for 
a “bona fide commercial transaction,” the loans were all for the direct 
benefit of the family; therefore, the OCC aggregated the loans.126 
The direct-benefit test is not the only test at the OCC’s disposal. 
The common-enterprise tests allow the OCC to aggregate loans when 
the connection between the borrowers is less direct. The OCC’s 
regulations include three per se common-enterprise tests and one 
catch-all test.127 Unlike the catch-all test, the regulation’s three per se 
 
 117. Id. § 32.5(b)–(c). 
 118. Id. § 32.5(b). 
 119. Tex. Nat’l Bank Baytown, Tex., No. OCC-AA-EC-92-88, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 
272 (Apr. 20, 1994). 
 120. Id. at *4–5. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at *5–6. 
 123. Id. at *6. 
 124. Id. at *10. 
 125. Id. at *11–12. 
 126. Id. at *12. 
 127. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c) (2013). 
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common-enterprise tests provide guidance to national banks trying to 
abide by the lending-limit law. 
The first per se common-enterprise test declares a common 
enterprise to exist when the expected source of repayment for two 
loans “is the same for each borrower and neither borrower has 
another source of income from which the loan . . . may be fully 
repaid.”128 For instance, Corporation A and Corporation B both have 
loans from the same bank.129 Corporation A derives all of its income 
from the production of sausage, and each year it sells all of its sausage 
to Corporation B. In turn, the income of corporation B is 100 percent 
derived from the retail marketing of Corporation A’s sausage; 
Corporation B does not receive any sausage from any other 
corporation. The expected source of repayment for both loans is 
effectively the same, and neither borrower has another source of 
income with which to repay the loans; therefore, the loans are for a 
common enterprise, and the OCC would aggregate them.130 
The second per se common-enterprise test declares a common 
enterprise to exist when loans are made “[t]o borrowers who are 
related directly or indirectly through common control,” provided that 
“50 percent or more of one borrower’s gross receipts or gross 
expenditures . . . are derived from transactions with the other 
borrower.”131 For instance, a bank makes loans both to a Subchapter S 
corporation and to the 100 percent owner of that corporation.132 
Seventy-two percent of the owner’s gross receipts come from that 
corporation.133 Pursuant to the second per se common-enterprise test, 
the owner and the corporation are related through common control, 
and substantial financial interdependence exists between them; 
therefore, the OCC would aggregate these loans.134 
The third per se test declares a common enterprise to exist when 
the borrowers’ purpose in obtaining the loans is “to acquire a 
 
 128. Id. § 32.5(c)(1). 
 129. The example used here is based on an example in the Missouri Code of State 
Regulations.  See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 1140-2.080(3)(A) (2013).  
 130. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(1) (deeming a common enterprise to exist “[w]hen the expected 
source of repayment for each loan or extension of credit is the same for each borrower and 
neither borrower has another source of income from which the loan (together with the 
borrower’s other obligations) may be fully repaid”). 
 131. Id.  § 32.5(c)(2). 
 132. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18, 
2001). 
 133. Id. at 33 n.10. 
 134. Id. at 32–33 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(2) (2000)). 
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business enterprise of which those borrowers will own more than 50 
percent of the voting securities or voting interests.”135 For instance, a 
bank makes loans to six individual borrowers, each of whom uses the 
loans to invest in a new limited liability company.136 Combined, the six 
borrowers hold 100 percent of the membership interests in that 
company.137 Even if each borrower were a longstanding bank 
customer with significant net worth, the OCC would aggregate the 
loans pursuant to the third per se common-enterprise test because all 
loan proceeds were used “to invest in and acquire more than 50 
percent of a business enterprise.”138 
In contrast to these per se common-enterprise tests, the OCC has 
promulgated a catch-all test. The OCC deems a common enterprise to 
exist “[w]hen [it] determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts 
and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common 
enterprise exists.”139 The presence of this unfettered discretion should 
cause concern to any bank that is trying to decipher the OCC’s rules. 
To determine whether the OCC will aggregate certain loans pursuant 
to the catch-all provision, banks have no other option but to spend 
time and money requesting an interpretive letter from the OCC, 
which the OCC has acknowledged may flood the OCC “with an 
endless stream of requests for opinion letters” regarding the scope of 
the catch-all test.140 
The OCC has cited thirteen factors as having some bearing on 
whether the OCC will determine that a common enterprise exists, but 
it has not attempted to establish any additional per se rules based on 
these factors. These thirteen factors are as follows: 
 
(1)  engaging in supporting lines of business; 
(2)  interchange of goods and services; 
(3)  common ownership of assets; 
(4)  common management; 
(5)  use of common facilities; 
(6)  commingling of assets and liabilities; 
 
 135. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(3) (2012). 
 136. [Redacted] Nat’l Bank, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 863, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 1999, at 49, 
49 (July 22, 1999). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4). 
 140. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
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(7)  closely related business activities; 
(8)  similarity in structure, financing and holding; 
(9)  use of same business address; 
(10)centralized cash management program; 
(11)likelihood that a financially troubled member of the group 
would receive financial aid from other members of the group; 
(12)family relationships among the borrowers; and 
(13)pledging of assets to support another person’s loans.141 
 
The OCC has provided no guidance as to how these thirteen factors 
are to be weighed against one another, or how many factors are 
required to warrant combination. 
Notwithstanding its pro-industry reputation,142 the OCC has 
expressed its willingness to rely on the facts-and-circumstances 
provision of the combination rules,143 which grants the OCC the 
authority to deem a common enterprise to exist ad hoc.144 In an 
interpretive letter, the OCC has explicitly rebuked the notion that 
this provision is “merely a prefatory statement.”145 The OCC has 
recognized the concern about “the extent to which this regulation 
grants to examiners discretion to judge when a common enterprise 
exists.”146 It has rejected the notion “that the facts and circumstances 
provision must be directly, substantially, and demonstrably tied to the 
three per se tests which follow,” even if “otherwise the provision 
becomes an ambiguous standard that can only be applied on a post 
hoc basis during the examination process.”147 The facts and 
circumstances provision “is indeed a stand alone provision,”148 and, 
 
 141. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18, 
2001); accord [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 925, O.C.C. Q.J., June 2002, at 65, 66 
(Apr. 12, 2001). 
 142. See Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit 
Market, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 410 
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (“But the[] main mission [of the OCC and 
other banking regulators] is to protect the financial stability of banks and other financial 
institutions, not to protect consumers. As a result, they focus intently on bank profitability and 
the maintenance of sufficient capital reserves relative to outstanding loans, and far less on the 
financial impact that many of the products sold by the banks will have on consumers.”). 
 143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 144. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4). 
 145. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 563, 11-1 O.C.C. Q.J., Mar. 1992, at 71, 71 
(Sept. 6, 1991). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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with it, the OCC has “reserve[d] the ability to attribute loans under 
the general rule even when none of the specific rules is directly 
applicable.”149 
The OCC “believe[s] that instances where the facts and 
circumstances test will apply to the exclusion of the per se rules will 
be rare.”150 But this may not always be the case. Considering the 
increasing negative press against the OCC in the wake of the 2008 
recession,151 the OCC’s moderation might not continue. Senators Jack 
Reed and Carl Levin have advocated for President Obama “to 
fundamentally re-think the OCC’s leadership” after comments by 
John Walsh, the former acting comptroller of the currency, that 
warned against the danger of excessive financial regulation.152 
To determine whether the OCC will aggregate certain loans 
pursuant to the catch-all provision, banks may write to the OCC and 
request an interpretive letter.153 The ability to request an interpretive 
letter and inquire into whether the OCC will aggregate loans to two 
borrowers mitigates the sympathy that a court or the public may have 
for a bank that falls victim to the regulation’s facts-and-circumstances 
provision.154 Nevertheless, the regulation-by-enforcement critique, 
which argues that agencies should establish readily understandable 
per se rules, counsels against the OCC’s reliance on interpretive 
letters if the law could be made clear without them.155 
 
 149. Id. at 72 (quoting National Bank Lending Limit, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,398, 43,402 (Oct. 24, 
1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 32)). 
 150. Id. at 73. 
 151. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 3 (“‘The O.C.C. is acting as if there was never a 
financial crisis,’ said Dennis Kelleher, president of Better Markets, a nonprofit group that 
advocates for increased regulation of the financial industry. ‘It’s just an utterly indefensible 
abdication of its responsibility to the American people.’”). 
 152. Press Release, Office of Sen. Jack Reed, supra note 4; see also John Walsh, 
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 
(June 21, 2011), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2011/pub-speech-
2011-78.pdf (advocating for “caution regarding the cumulative effects” of increased banking 
regulation). 
 153. Cf. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified 
in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (noting that cautious banks may flood the OCC “with an 
endless stream of requests for opinion letters” regarding the scope of § 32.5). 
 154. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) 
(“[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because [inter alia] . . . the 
regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own 
inquiry . . . .”). 
 155. See supra Part I. 
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Even the OCC has recognized that the combination rules would 
ideally consist of per se rules: when amending the combination rules, 
the OCC has attempted to “set[] forth clear rules which were 
internally consistent and were logical from both a legal and financial 
perspective.”156 For instance, in 1995, the OCC amended the 
combination rules to remove a second facts-and-circumstances catch-
all provision from the direct-benefit test.157 In making this change, the 
OCC declared that its purpose was “to improve certainty regarding 
the application of the test.”158 Thus, despite maintaining the facts-and-
circumstances provision of the common-enterprise test,159 the OCC 
conceded the desirability of crafting clear combination rules. 
Following the federal government’s lead, many states have 
enacted statutes or regulations that mirror the federal scheme and 
that permit their states’ banking regulators to make similar ad hoc 
determinations.160 Despite the pervasive mimicry of the federal 
 
 156. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846. 
 157. Lending Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 15, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 32). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-262(b)(4) (West 2011) (aggregating loans 
“[w]hen the commissioner determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances 
of particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-
705(5)(b)(iv) (Supp. 2012) (aggregating loans “[w]hen the director determines, based upon an 
evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common enterprise 
exists”); IOWA CODE § 524.904(6)(e) (2011) (aggregating loans “[w]hen the superintendent 
determines the interests of a group of more than one borrower, or any combination of the 
members of the group, are so interrelated that they should be considered a unit”); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 9-1104(f)(6) (2001) (“[T]he commissioner may determine, based upon an evaluation of 
the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction, that a loan to one borrower may be 
attributed to another borrower.”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 701-101.64(H)(3)(d) (2013) 
(aggregating loans when “[t]he Banking Board determines, based upon an evaluation of the 
facts and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); GA. 
COMP. R. & REGS. 80-1-5.11(3)(d) (2012) (aggregating loans when “the Department 
determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions, 
that a common enterprise exi[s]ts”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 662.008(3)(b)(3) (2011) (aggregating 
loans when “[a]ny other circumstances exist which indicate that one or more persons acting in 
concert directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management of policies 
of another person”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 77.3 (2013) (authorizing “the 
Banking Department [to] criticize such undue concentration of credit [among multiple 
borrowers] and [to] take such other supervisory action with respect thereto as may be deemed 
necessary or appropriate,” even if a bank’s loans do not otherwise fall within the regulation’s 
combination rules); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1301:1-3-01(D)(3)(d) (2013) (aggregating loans when 
“the superintendent determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances or 
particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 85:10-11-
10(b)(2)(A) (2012) (noting that “[w]hether two or more persons are engaged in a ‘common 
enterprise’ will depend upon a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular 
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scheme, some states, including Delaware, Alaska, and Montana, have 
refrained from granting an agency the ability to make ad hoc 
determinations, choosing instead to use only per se rules to determine 
whether to aggregate certain loans for state banks.161 In these states, 
state banks can turn to the respective combination rules and 
understand them without needing to request an interpretive letter.  
Interestingly, these three states—Delaware, Alaska, and 
Montana—have not suffered a single bank failure between October 1, 
2000 (when the FDIC’s data begins) and April 5, 2013, although more 
than five hundred banks in other states have failed during this 
period.162 Although the successes of these states cannot be attributed 
to their clearly delineated per se combination rules, they do provide 
evidence that regulation by enforcement is not a categorical necessity 
for combination rules. The OCC should learn from these states, which 
serve as “social laboratories” from which other states and the federal 
government might learn.163  
B. The Penalty for a Violation 
Violating the lending-limit law may lead to a substantial penalty, 
and, under the facts-and-circumstances provision, a person may 
violate the law unknowingly. The federal lending-limit law conditions 
punishment on the commission of a knowing violation of the law, 
 
transactions”); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-505-3080(4) (2013) (aggregating loans when “the Director 
determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions, 
that a common enterprise exists”); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 12.9(a)(4) (2012) (aggregating loans 
when “the banking commissioner determines that a loan should be attributed to another 
person”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-512-260(2) (2013) (noting that “whether a ‘common 
enterprise’ exists depends upon a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular transaction”); W. VA. CODE R. § 106-9-4.2(a) (2013) (noting that “[w]hether 
two . . . or more persons are engaged in a common enterprise depends upon a realistic 
evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions”). 
 161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 5, § 909(c) (2001) (excluding any mention of “common 
enterprise”); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 02.125(c) (2008) (roughly tracking 12 C.F.R. § 32.5 
but not including a “facts and circumstances” provision); MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.59.108 (2013) 
(largely replicating 12 C.F.R. § 32.5 but not including a “facts and circumstances” provision). 
 162. See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. Faring equally well were Maine, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. See id. The relatively small populations of these seven states may in part 
explain why these states had no bank failures. 
 163. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981) (“It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting))). 
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thereby protecting directors who negligently violate the law.164 Yet the 
word “knowingly” does not excuse a defendant who knowingly 
engages in certain conduct but who is ignorant that the law prohibits 
such conduct.165 A legal mistake is generally irrelevant to the courts.166 
Although some states have written a fair-notice requirement into 
their respective lending-limit laws or regulations,167 the federal scheme 
does not require fair notice.168 Granted, courts may nevertheless read 
the OCC’s regulations to contain a fair-notice requirement, as they 
have in other contexts.169 However, courts rarely do so.170 Therefore, if 
 
 164. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2006). The Supreme Court has discussed in detail the mens rea 
requirement for a lending-limit violation: 
[I]t must appear not only that the liabilities of a person, company, firm, etc., to the 
[b]ank for money borrowed were permitted to exceed the prescribed limit, but that 
[the bank director] . . . participated in or assented to the excessive loan or loans not 
through mere negligence but knowingly and in effect intentionally, with this 
qualification, that if he deliberately refrained from investigating that which it was his 
duty to investigate, any resulting violation of the statute must be regarded as “in 
effect intentional.” 
Corsicana Nat’l Bank of Corsicana v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1919) (quoting Yates v. 
Jones Nat’l Bank, 206 U.S. 158, 180 (1907)) (applying the law that preceded 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006 
& Supp. V 2012)). 
 165. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123–24 (1974) (“To require proof of a 
defendant’s knowledge of the legal status of the [conduct committed] would permit the 
defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law. Such 
a formulation of the scienter requirement is [not] required . . . .”). 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he government 
need prove only that the defendant knew the operative facts which make his action illegal. The 
government need not prove that the defendants understood the legal consequences of those 
facts or were even aware of the existence of the law granting them significance.”); see also 21 
AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 137 (2011) (“[I]t is a deeply rooted common-law principle that 
ignorance or mistake of law provides no defense or excuse for a crime.”). 
 167. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 524.904(6)(e) (2011) (giving banks an opportunity to cure a 
violation of the Iowa lending-limit law after Iowa’s superintendent of banking has deemed a 
violation to exist); MINN. STAT. § 48.24(8) (2012 & Supp. 2013) (requiring a willful violation, as 
opposed to a knowing violation, before an officer or employee of the bank becomes “personally 
liable to the bank for the amount of the loan in excess of the statutory limit”); OKLA. ADMIN. 
CODE § 85:10-11-10(d)(7) (2012) (giving banks an opportunity to cure an “inadvertent” 
violation). 
 168. 12 U.S.C. § 93 (2006). 
 169. See, e.g., Beaver Plant Operations, Inc. v. Herman, 223 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(establishing that in the absence of a clearly articulated standard, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) could not demonstrate a violation without showing “fair notice 
of its interpretation of the cited standard”); Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that the court would violate due process by deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of 
its own rules if “doing so would penalize an individual who has not received fair notice of a 
regulatory violation”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding, 
in light of unclear EPA policies, that “where the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive 
reading of the regulatory requirements, a regulated party is not ‘on notice’ of the agency’s 
ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and may not be punished”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
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the OCC exercises its right under the combination rules to decide ad 
hoc that it will aggregate two loans, then a bank and its directors may 
violate the lending-limit law, even if they had no reason to know that 
the OCC would aggregate the two loans. 
The penalty for a knowing violation of the federal lending-limit 
law may include the forfeiture of “all the rights, privileges, and 
franchises of the [national banking] association.”171 For example, after 
the directors of a California bank exceeded that bank’s lending limit 
and attempted to game the combination rules, the OCC issued an 
order “prohibiting [them] from further participation in the banking 
industry.”172 In addition, the order stated that every director of a bank 
“who participated in or assented to [a violation] shall be held liable in 
his personal and individual capacity for all damages which the 
association, its shareholders, or any other person, shall have sustained 
in consequence of such violation.”173 After another California bank 
exceeded its lending limit, its directors were held personally liable for 
the difference between the bank’s actual lending limit and the amount 
of money it lost on its defaulted, excessive loans.174 A civil penalty, in 
certain situations, may also be assessed against an infracting bank in 
 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
unclear Mine Safety and Health Review Commission regulations cannot form the basis of civil 
and criminal penalties); Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 593 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979) (explaining that “an employer is not required to 
assume the burden of guessing what the Secretary [of OSHA] intended the safety regulations to 
mean”); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1335 (6th Cir. 1978) (identifying “adequate 
warning of what [statutes and regulations] command or forbid” as “fundamental” to due 
process); Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 
645, 650 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to construe regulations liberally and noting that “the Secretary 
[of OSHA] has the responsibility to state with ascertainable certainty what is meant by the 
standards he has promulgated”). 
 170. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) 
(“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative importance of 
fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, 
economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often 
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, 
can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated 
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by 
resort to an administrative process.” (footnotes omitted)); see also John F. Manning, 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 670–71 n.282 (1996) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has never held that an 
agency interpretation of a regulation was invalid because of a lack of fair notice.”). 
 171. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2006). 
 172. Ulrich, No. AA-EC-00-40, 2003 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 82, at *77–78 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
 173. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a). 
 174. Del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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an amount up to $1,000,000, although more modest civil penalties are 
usually assessed.175 For instance, the OCC assessed a penalty of only 
$5,000 against the president of a Texas bank after that bank exceeded 
its lending limit by over $1 million.176 The OCC has assessed penalties 
as high as $100,000.177 Thus, the penalties for a violation of the 
lending-limit law may be substantial, and, under the facts-and-
circumstances provision, a person may violate the law even though no 
per se rule proscribes the person’s conduct. 
III.  APPLYING THE REGULATION-BY-ENFORCEMENT CRITIQUE TO 
THE OCC’S COMBINATION RULES 
In light of these stiff penalties, the regulation-by-enforcement 
critique weighs particularly heavy on the combination rules. Thus, 
before applying the regulation-by-enforcement critique, it is crucial to 
understand why the OCC would use regulation by enforcement in this 
context. This Part explains why the OCC has rejected the notion “that 
the facts and circumstances provision must be directly, substantially, 
and demonstrably tied to the three per se tests which follow,” even 
when “otherwise the provision becomes an ambiguous standard that 
can only be applied on a post hoc basis during the examination 
process.”178 
A. An Attempt at Justifying the Facts and Circumstances Provision 
The primary reason for the OCC’s decision to rely on regulation 
by enforcement is to thwart those who would endeavor to find 
loopholes around the combination rules. The OCC has declared that 
it crafted the combination rules with an eye to “attempt[ing] to 
eliminate many of the[] loopholes” that had previously permitted 
banks and borrowers to circumvent the rule.179 The OCC sought to 
prevent the combination rules from being underinclusive, as notice-
 
 175. 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(4). 
 176. Jordan, No. 2009-064, 2009 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 68, at *1–4 (2009). 
 177. [Redacted], No. OCC AA-EC-88-17, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 26, at *1 (1989). 
 178. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 563, O.C.C. Q.J., Mar. 1992, at 71, 71 (Sept. 6, 
1991). 
 179. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,847 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
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and-comment rulemaking may be too slow to respond to those who 
would exploit loopholes in the combination rules.180 
The avoidance of loopholes is a legitimate concern.181 Would-be 
lawbreakers are creative,182 and neither a legislative body nor an 
administrative agency can outsmart them quickly enough.183 
Regulations generally do not apply retroactively,184 and rulemaking is 
a slow process.185 Even though courts often look with disfavor upon 
crafty would-be lawbreakers,186 the OCC may fear that these 
lawbreakers could find ways to avoid the per se combination rules 
and thereby avoid punishment.187 
 
 180. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 156 (“[T]here are administrative benefits 
to . . . regulation by enforcement. Among other things . . . the agency is able to react to specific 
facts[] and tailor its responses to each new situation; [and] the agency is not required to conform 
its actions to procedures that can . . . delay the articulation of new legal standards . . . .”). 
 181. See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 108 F.3d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[B]y requiring regulations to be too specific 
[courts] would be opening up large loopholes allowing conduct which should be regulated to 
escape regulation.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Ray Evers Welding Co. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 625 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1980))); State v. 
Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 1997) (“[I]t is apparent that in many instances the uncertainty 
[in a statute] is merely attributable to a desire not to nullify the purpose of the legislation by the 
use of specific terms which would afford loopholes through which many could escape.” (quoting 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 84–85 (1972)) (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 182. See, e.g., Judith Yates Borger, High Drama in the Courts: Bar Owners Try To Skirt 
State’s Smoking Ban, MINN. POST (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2008/04/
28/1585/high_drama_in_the_courts_bar_owners_try_to_skirt_states_smoking_ban (describing 
various attempts by bar owners to utilize loopholes in state smoking laws, including a Minnesota 
bar’s attempt to label its patrons as actors to take advantage of an exception to a smoking ban 
for theatrical performances). 
 183. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 127, 138 (1997) (“Because the means by which bad people can invade the rights 
of others are infinitely numerous and diverse, any attempt to specify them all by statute is 
bound to be incomplete.”). 
 184. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“Retroactivity is not 
favored in the law. Thus . . . administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect 
unless their language requires this result.”). 
 185. Park, supra note 22, at 668. 
 186. When a court must rule either for someone who is sincerely trying to enforce a law or 
someone who is deliberately and mischievously trying to circumvent the law, the court is 
unlikely to rule for the latter. See, e.g., Taverns for Tots, Inc. v. City of Toledo, 307 F. Supp. 2d 
933, 940–42 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (recognizing that the plaintiff, “a sham corporation,” ostensibly 
qualified under an exemption to the Toledo smoking ordinance and that the court could not in 
this case pierce the corporate veil, but nevertheless refusing to allow the plaintiff to benefit from 
the exemption, “despite [the sham corporation’s] putative or even partially eleemosynary 
purposes”). 
 187. See Albert C. Lin, Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What Notice Is Required of Civil 
Regulations?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 991, 1024 (2003) (“Writing a rule with greater specificity 
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Due to the threat posed by loopholes, some regulations arguably 
require regulation by enforcement to be successful.188 For instance, 
Congress and the SEC have purposefully refused to codify a 
definition of insider trading.189 When more than half of traders are 
willing to admit that they would act upon an illegal tip if they could 
avoid detection,190 the SEC’s use of regulation by enforcement to 
prevent insider trading is “not astonishing” because it is trying to 
attack an almost existential problem.191 For insider trading, regulation 
by enforcement may arguably be necessary to deter traders who are 
determined to find ways to circumvent the law.192 However, insider 
trading is a special case. Whether regulation by enforcement is 
appropriate for insider trading has little bearing on whether 
regulation by enforcement is appropriate for the OCC. 
B. Why Regulation by Enforcement Is Inappropriate for the 
Combination Rules 
At times, regulation by enforcement can perhaps be an 
appropriate means of preventing the exploitation of loopholes, but it 
must be fair to the regulated industry. For regulation by enforcement 
to be fair, two characteristics must be present. First, the result of the 
agency’s ad hoc decision must be based on an overarching principle 
 
increases the risk of ‘loopholing,’ as regulated entities seek creative ways to skirt the law’s edges 
without violating it. Regulatory vagueness, by making the outer edges of the law uncertain, 
discourages regulated entities’ efforts to find loopholes in the law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 188. See Park, supra note 22, at 681–88 (discussing when regulation by enforcement is 
warranted). 
 189. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, 
Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider 
Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 398 (“The SEC, as well as Congress, seem to 
have concluded that the definition of insider trading is better developed through the common 
law approach of case-by-case decisions rather than through codification.”); Enactment of Insider 
Trading Bill Unlikely This Year, SEC Official Says, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 323, 324 
(1988) (“[House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman] Dingell opposes legislation to 
define insider trading because he believes it would narrow the SEC’s ability to bring 
enforcement actions . . . .”). 
 190. See Roger Lowenstein, The Greed Police, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 25, 2011, at 36, 38 
(“In a survey of 2,500 traders taken in 2007, more than half said they would take advantage of 
an illegal tip if they were assured they wouldn’t be caught.”). 
 191. Kamman & Hood, supra note 189, at 398. 
 192. See Lowenstein, supra note 190, at 38 (“Though lawmakers have proposed legislation 
codifying insider trading in the statutes, the S.E.C. seems to prefer a common-law approach, on 
the theory that it will be a less fixed—thus a more worrisome—deterrent.”). But see generally 
Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14 (criticizing the SEC for relying on regulation by enforcement for 
insider-trading cases). 
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that is well-established so that the regulated industry may effectively 
have had fair notice that it should not have pursued a given course of 
action.193 Second, to justify regulation by enforcement, the public must 
face significant harm as a result of the misconduct.194 
If the overarching principle motivating the combination rules is 
not well-established, then regulation by enforcement is not justified, 
because the regulated industry could not intuit that it should not have 
issued the loans that it issued.195 The OCC has given scant guidance on 
when it will deem a common enterprise to exist based on the facts and 
circumstances of a given situation, and the motivating principle 
behind the application of the facts-and-circumstances test is neither 
intuitive nor well-established. The OCC’s only guidance has come in 
the form of a thirteen-factor list—factors which may contribute 
toward such a finding.196 These thirteen factors are broad and include 
“engaging in supporting lines of business, interchange of goods and 
services, . . . use of common facilities, . . . closely related business 
activities, similarity in structure, . . . likelihood that a financially 
troubled [borrower] would receive financial aid from [the other 
borrower], [and] family relationships.”197 Due to these factors’ 
breadth, a bank can know whether the OCC will utilize the catch-all 
provision only if it first requests an interpretive letter. So long as none 
of the three per se common-enterprise tests are met, a bank cannot 
expect that a common enterprise exists. Because the principle behind 
the facts-and-circumstances test is not well-established, the OCC 
should not utilize regulation by enforcement. 
Even if such a principle were well-established, the OCC should 
not utilize regulation by enforcement because of the mismatch 
between the public harm—the costs of bank failure—and the 
proscribed violation—lending too much money to interrelated 
borrowers. The express purpose of the lending-limit law is “to protect 
the safety and soundness of national banks and savings associations 
by preventing excessive loans to one person, or to related persons 
 
 193. Park, supra note 22, at 681.  
 194. Id. at 682.  
 195. See id. at 681–82 (“If the principle is novel, then fair notice concerns become more 
significant and the conduct may be less likely to violate values on which there is societal 
consensus. . . . If the misconduct causes significant public harm, the case for confronting such 
wrongdoing with a principles-based enforcement action is stronger.”). 
 196. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 197. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18, 
2001).  
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that are financially dependent, and to promote diversification of loans 
and equitable access to banking services.”198 The lending-limit law 
serves to diminish the risk that a bank may need to absorb a 
substantial loan default, which could cause the bank to become 
insolvent.199 The harm to the public from a bank violating the lending-
limit law is trivial unless the bank becomes insolvent as a result of the 
excessive loans. If a bank has issued loans exceeding its lending limit, 
but the borrowers have repaid those loans, then no harm has 
occurred. Although the safety and soundness of the bank may have 
been in jeopardy, the risk did not materialize. In contrast, if a bank 
has issued loans exceeding its lending limit and the borrowers have 
defaulted on those loans, then the bank must absorb the cost.200 
Bankers, not wishing for their banks to go insolvent, establish 
reserves to absorb potential losses.201 These reserves typically exceed 
bank equity by ten to fifteen times.202 Although a default on a loan 
that exceeds a bank’s lending limit may consume a bank’s reserves 
and render the bank insolvent,203 the bank’s reserves can provide a 
cushion to prevent insolvency. If, despite this cushion, a bank does 
become insolvent, then the cost to the government may be several 
millions of dollars,204 as the government generally insures deposits up 
 
 198. 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2012). Although the goal of “diversification of loans and equitable 
access” may sound like an equality concern, the OCC has made clear that it is concerned only 
with the safety and soundness of the banks. See Lending Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 15, 1995) 
(“The final rule . . . refocuses the lending limit rules on the areas of greatest safety and 
soundness concern. The new rule enhances the ability of national banks to lend while protecting 
against situations where excessive loans to a borrower or related borrowers present safety and 
soundness concerns.”).  
 199. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1010 (2010) (“Difficulty establishing a private cause of action stems 
from the fact that limitations on lending were established to protect the solvency of the bank 
rather than to protect an individual borrower.”). 
 200. Gay Hatfield & Carol Lancaster, The Signalling Effects of Bank Loan-Loss Reserve 
Additions, J. FIN. & STRATEGIC DECISIONS, Spring 2000, at 57, 57. 
 201. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ALLOWANCE FOR LOAN 
AND LEASE LOSSES, 5–15, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2006/
SR0617a1.pdf (describing how much capital a bank should have in its reserves). 
 202. James M. Wahlen, The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss 
Disclosures, 69 ACCT. REV. 455, 455 (1994); see also Hatfield & Lancaster, supra note 200, at 57 
(citing Wahlen, supra, at 455). 
 203. E.g., [Redacted], No. OCC AA-EC-88-17, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 26, at *13–14 
(1989). 
 204. Id.  
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to $250,000 in the event of a bank collapse.205 Thus, lending-limit 
violations can still spell insolvency for a bank, and that risk should not 
be discounted.206 The financial harm to the public can be significant.207 
Yet regulation by enforcement is not the only way to prevent 
banks from violating the spirit of the combination rules. The OCC 
could draft more comprehensive combination rules by including 
additional per se rules. The OCC has already announced the thirteen 
factors that it considers to be relevant to an inquiry of whether the 
facts and circumstances indicate that a common enterprise exists 
between two borrowers.208 The OCC could transform some of these 
factors into additional rules. For instance, the OCC could add a rule 
that would aggregate loans made to spouses.209 The OCC could also 
add a rule that would aggregate loans made to two borrowers who 
share a centralized cash management system.210 Any such rule would 
lessen the ability of banks to issue excessively risky loans without the 
OCC needing to rely upon enforcement via the catch-all facts and 
circumstances provision. 
The OCC may have decided that the upfront costs necessary to 
craft a more comprehensive regulation were not worth the expense,211 
 
 205. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012).  
 206. In 2007–2012, the estimated loss caused by all bank failures totaled almost $90 million. 
Failures and Assistance Transactions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/
hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (select “United States” and 
“Other Areas” in the “State” field, “2007” and “2012” in the “Effective Date(s) field, and 
“Detail” in the “Type of Report” field; then click “Produce Report”). The estimated loss is the 
difference between the amount the FDIC disbursed from the Deposit Insurance Fund to cover 
obligations to insured depositors and the amount estimated to be recovered or recoverable from 
liquidating the receivership estate. Historical Statistics on Banking Help, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp#BF1EC (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 207. The bailouts in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis led the U.S. government to spend 
$2.5 trillion and to make $12.2 trillion in commitments to various institutions. Adding up the 
Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html. 
 208. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 209. Cf. supra note 141 and accompanying text (listing thirteen factors relevant to the “facts 
and circumstances” provision). 
 210. See [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 
(Jan. 18, 2001) (listing the presence of a centralized cash-management program as a factor in 
finding that the facts and circumstances warrant deeming a common enterprise to exist). A cash-
management system is a cash depository that acts as a netting center and repository of surplus 
funds, pooling the excess cash from each person and paying it to the other persons when they 
experience a cash shortage. THUMMULURI SIDDAIAH, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 313 (2010). 
 211. See Lin, supra note 187, at 1025 (“[S]ome vagueness in the law is tolerable because the 
costs of eliminating vagueness may simply be too high. These costs include the direct cost 
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especially considering how rarely the OCC uses the catch-all 
provision.212 Yet rule-of-law values should not be sacrificed so easily. 
Moreover, although drafting a more comprehensive regulation 
requires additional time and effort,213 more comprehensive 
regulations may actually reduce enforcement costs for an agency by 
decreasing the number of requests for interpretive letters that the 
agency receives.214 Each interpretive letter that explains whether the 
OCC will aggregate particular loans under the facts-and-
circumstances provision costs the OCC time and money—costs that it 
could largely have avoided incurring. The OCC has already revised 
the combination rules five times in the past thirty years.215 Whatever 
costs the OCC may incur in revising the combination rules do not 
warrant the OCC’s decision to turn to regulation by enforcement as a 
first resort. The OCC should take the time to identify what the law is. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the facts-and-circumstances provision,216 banks are 
unable to ascertain from a reading of the federal combination rules 
whether the OCC will aggregate loans made to certain related 
borrowers. Instead, they must either request an interpretive letter 
from the OCC or risk the OCC later deciding to aggregate the loans. 
As the regulation-by-enforcement critique shows, this ad hoc 
“rulemaking” conflicts with rule-of-law values.217 
Regulation by enforcement is best reserved as an agency’s “last 
resort.”218 The facts-and-circumstances provision is not justified by the 
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need to ensure the safety and soundness of banks; nevertheless, the 
OCC has reserved for itself the ability “to flit serendipitously from 
case to case, like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the 
rules as it goes along.”219 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, sound 
regulation of financial institutions is perhaps more needed than ever, 
but the OCC has opted to treat lending limits like Calvinball, 
“making up new rules on the fly to justify whatever [it], for some 
reason, want[s].”220 
The OCC has already recognized once before, when it removed 
the facts-and-circumstances provision from the direct-benefit test, 
that it should use per se rules.221 The OCC should do so again by 
removing the analogous facts-and-circumstances provision from the 
common-enterprise test. If the OCC finds that the remaining per se 
tests are insufficient to cover every situation in which loans should be 
aggregated, then the OCC should add more per se tests. 
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